S
ocieties need to protect their citizens against certain risks, especially current and future health problems, poverty, and labor shocks. In designing such social protection, most Latin American countries have followed the Bismarkian tradition of collecting in the labor markets the revenues needed for coverage. Unfortunately, this approach has not achieved universal coverage and important segments, especially the poor, remain vulnerable. Governments have tackled this problem by designing social protection policies to cover uncovered workers and their households through substitute public goods and services, such as free or low-cost health insurance, food vouchers, training vouchers, cash transfers, subsidized credit, and subsidized housing. While these policies may improve citizens' well-being, they may also encourage informality and have certain harmful effects on productivity (Levy 2008) . This chapter argues that rather than eliminating social policies because of the collateral damage they may cause, they must be redesigned with productivity issues in mind.
Consider the case of free health insurance for families who are not entitled to it through formal employment. Two very different effects-one expected and the other unintended-occur. The most immediate and desirable impact is to mitigate the negative consequences of an illness or injury. However, free health insurance also reduces people's incentive to seek health insurance provided through formal employment and thus diminishes the likelihood that they will look for a quality job (or at least one covered by social security). When individuals have the option of being covered within or outside of labor markets (and one option is costly while the other one is free), wage distortions result, as equally productive individuals receive different wages, depending upon whether or not they are covered through the labor markets. Firms, in turn, face distorted labor prices and are induced to make decisions about labor allocation and scale of operations that may reduce total factor productivity (TFP) (see Chapter 4) and hamper productivity.
This chapter explores the extent to which social policies-either through spending or regulation-induce workers and firms to pursue informality, thereby incurring productivity losses. Before proceeding, however, it is important not to minimize the importance of social policies. Such policies play a central role in helping the state perform several key functions: coordinating the provision of public goods, filling in for missing markets (such as risk-pooling mechanisms), and mitigating the negative impact of power imbalances and distributional issues. In meeting these needs, social policies help maintain harmonious and cohesive societies. Such societies, in turn, are more conducive to productivity, reducing transaction costs and expanding business possibilities frontiers (IDB 2007) . However, this chapter argues that some social policies inadvertently encourage informality and aggravate some of the maladies that limit the productive potential of economies. Thus, it is important to focus on the incentives some social policies generate and reassess their design and implementation to maximize their gains. Rather than eliminating social policies because of the collateral damage they may cause, they must be redesigned with their effects on productivity in mind.
Social Policies and Informality
Before delving into a discussion on the impact of social policies on informality, it is important to state some working definitions and establish the conceptual frameworks for these terms. As Kanbur (2009) notes, informality "is a term that has the dubious distinction of combining maximum policy importance and political salience with minimal conceptual clarity and coherence." To allow for cross-country comparisons, formal workers are defined here as all those who are effectively covered by government regulations (that is, mandated to be covered by social security and effectively compliant). Accordingly, the terms effective coverage and formality are used here interchangeably. This view combines the legalistic definition of informality with the notion of compliance. Evasion is an important element in this concept. Just as firms evade social security, they also evade taxes, as shown in Chapter 7 on taxation. Throughout Latin America, the level of noncompliance and avoidance of the regulations that require employers to provide and pay for social services is high. For instance, more than two-thirds of the population lacks old-age insurance or pensions. As panel (a) of Figure 8 .1 shows, coverage
